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Abstract
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which a con-
vex set is approachable in a game with partial monitoring, i.e. where
players do not observe their opponents’ moves but receive random sig-
nals. This condition is an extension of Blackwell’s Criterion in the full
monitoring framework, where players observe at least their payoffs.
When our condition is fulfilled, we construct explicitly an approacha-
bility strategy, derived from a strategy satisfying some internal consis-
tency property in an auxiliary game.
We also provide an example of a convex set, that is neither (weakly)-
approachable nor (weakly)-excludable, a situation that cannot occur
in the full monitoring case.
We finally apply our result to describe an ε-optimal strategy of
the uninformed player in a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete
information on one side.
Key Words : Repeated Games, Blackwell Approachability, Partial
Monitoring, Convex Sets, Incomplete Information
Introduction
Blackwell [4] introduced the notion of approachability in two-person (in-
finitely) repeated games with vector payoffs in some Euclidian space Rd, as
an analogue of Von Neumann’s minmax theorem. A player can approach a
given set E ⊂ Rd, if he can insure that, after some stage and with a great
probability, the average payoff will always remain close to E. Blackwell [4]
∗E´quipe Combinatoire et Optimisation, FRE 3232 CNRS, Universite´ Pierre et Marie
Curie - Paris 6, 4 place Jussieu, 75005 Paris. vianney.perchet@normalesup.org
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proved that if both players observe their payoffs and E satisfies some geo-
metric condition (E is then called a B-set), then Player 1 can approach it.
He also deduced that given a convex set C either Player 1 can approach it
or Player 2 can exclude it, i.e. the latter can approach the complement
of a neighborhood of C. As Soulaimani, Quincampoix & Sorin [1] have
recently proved that the notions of B-set (in a given repeated game) and
discriminating domains (for a suitably chosen differential game) coincide.
We consider the partial monitoring framework, where players do not
observe their opponent’s moves but receive random signals. We provide in
section 1.2 a necessary and sufficient condition under which a convex set is
approachable. We also construct an approachability strategy derived from
the construction (following Perchet [10]) of a strategy that has no internal
regret (internal consistency in this framework has been defined by Lehrer &
Solan [8], Definition 9).
Three classical results that hold in the full monitoring case do not extend
to the partial monitoring framework. Indeed, in a specific game introduced
in section 3.2, there exists a convex set C that is neither approachable by
Player 1 nor excludable by Player 2 (see Theorem 3 in Blackwell [4]). More-
over, C is not approachable by Player 1 while every half-space that contains
it is approachable by Plater 1 (see Corollary 2 in Blackwell [4]). Finally, C
is neither weakly-approachable nor weakly-excludable (see Vieille [12]). We
recall that weak-approachability is a weaker notion than approachability,
also introduced by Blackwell [4], in finitely repeated games (see Definition
1.2 in section 1).
Kohlberg [7] used the notion of approachability in order to construct
optimal strategies of the uninformed player, in the class of zero-sum repeated
games with incomplete information on one side (introduced by Aumann &
Maschler [2]). Our result can be used in this framework to provide a simple
proof of the existence of a value in the infinitely repeated game through the
construction of an ǫ-optimal strategy of Player 2.
1 Approachability
Consider a two-person game Γ repeated in discrete time. At stage n ∈ N,
Player 1 (resp. Player 2) chooses an action in ∈ I (resp. jn ∈ J), where both
sets I and J are finite. This generates a vector payoff ρn = ρ(in, jn) ∈ Rd
where ρ is a mapping from I × J to Rd. Player 1 does not observe jn nor
ρn but receives a random signal sn ∈ S whose law is s(in, jn) where s is a
mapping from I × J to ∆(S) (the set of probabilities over the finite set S).
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Player 2 observes in, jn and sn. The choices of in and jn depend only on
the past observations of the players and may be random.
Explicitly, a strategy σ of Player 1 is a mapping from H1 to ∆(I) where
H1 =
⋃
n∈N (I × S)n is the set of finite histories available to Player 1. After
the finite history h1n ∈ (I × S)n, σ(h1n) ∈ ∆(I) is the law of in+1. Similarly, a
strategy τ of Player 2 is a mapping from H2 =
⋃
n∈N (I × S × J)n to ∆(J).
A couple of strategies (σ, τ) generates a probability, denoted by Pσ,τ , over
H = (I × S × J)N, the set of plays embedded with the cylinder σ-field.
The two functions ρ and s are extended multilinearly to ∆(I)×∆(J) by
ρ(x, y) = Ex,y [ρ(i, j)] ∈ Rd and s(x, y) = Ex,y [s(i, j)] ∈ ∆(S).
The following notations will be used: for any sequence a = {am ∈
R
d}m∈N, the average of a up to stage n is denoted by an :=
∑n
m=1 am
/
n and
for any set E ⊂ Rd, the distance to E is denoted by dE(z) := infe∈E ‖z− e‖,
where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidian norm.
Definition 1.1 (Blackwell [4]) i) A closed set E ⊂ Rd is approachable
by Player 1 if for every ε > 0, there exist a strategy σ of Player 1 and
N ∈ N such that for every strategy τ of Player 2 and every n ≥ N :
Eσ,τ [dE(ρn)] ≤ ε and Pσ,τ
(
sup
n≥N
dE(ρn) ≥ ε
)
≤ ε.
Such a strategy σε is called an ε-approachability strategy of E.
ii) A set E is excludable by Player 2, if there exists δ > 0 such that
the complement of Eδ is approachable by Player 2, where Eδ = {z ∈
R
d; dE(z) ≤ δ}.
In words, a set E ⊂ Rd is approachable by Player 1, if he can insure that
the average payoff converges almost surely to E, uniformly with respect to
the strategies of Player 2. Obviously, a set E cannot be both approachable
by Player 1 and excludable by Player 2.
Definition 1.2 i) A closed set E is weakly-approachable by Player 1 if
for every ε > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that for every n ≥ N , there is
some strategy σn of Player 1 such that for every strategy τ of Player 2:
Eσn,τ [dE(ρn)] ≤ ε.
ii) A set E is weakly-excludable by Player 2, if there exists δ > 0 such that
the complement of Eδ is weakly-approachable by Player 2.
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We emphasize the fact that in the definition of weak-approachability, the
strategy of Player 1 might depend on n, the length of the game, which was
not the case in the definition of approachability.
1.1 Full monitoring case
A game satisfies full monitoring if Player 1 observes the moves of Player 2,
thus if S = J and s(i, j) = j. Blackwell [4] gave a sufficient geometric
condition under which a closed set E is approachable by Player 1. He
also provided a full characterization for convex sets. Stating his condition
requires the following notations: ΠE(z) = {e ∈ E; dE(z) = ‖z − e‖} is the
set of closest points to z ∈ Rd in E, and P 1(x) = {ρ(x, y); y ∈ ∆(J)} (resp.
P 2(y) = {ρ(x, y);x ∈ ∆(I)}) is the set of expected payoffs compatible with
x ∈ ∆(I) (resp. y ∈ ∆(J)).
Definition 1.3 A closed set E of Rd is a B-set, if for every z ∈ Rd, there
exist p ∈ ΠE(z) and x (= x(z)) ∈ ∆(I) such that the hyperplane through p
and perpendicular to z − p separates z from P 1(x), or formally:
∀z ∈ Rd,∃p ∈ ΠE(z),∃x ∈ ∆(I), 〈ρ(x, y) − p, z − p〉 ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ ∆(J). (1)
Condition (1) and therefore Theorem 1.4 do not require that Player 1
observes Player 2’s moves, but only his own payoffs (which was Blackwell’s
assumption).
Theorem 1.4 (Blackwell [4]) A B-set E is approachable by Player 1.
Moreover, consider the strategy σ of Player 1 defined by σ(hn) = x(ρn).
Then for every strategy τ of Player 2 and every η > 0:
Eσ,τ [d
2
E(ρn)] ≤
4B
n
and Pσ,τ
(
sup
n≥N
dE(ρn) ≥ η
)
≤ 8B
η2N
, (2)
with B = supi,j ‖ρ(i, j)‖2.
For a closed convex set C, a full characterization is available:
Corollary 1.5 (Blackwell [4]) A closed convex set C ⊂ Rd is approach-
able by Player 1 if and only if:
P 2(y) ∩ C 6= ∅, ∀y ∈ ∆(J). (3)
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Using a minmax argument, Blackwell [4] proved that condition (3) implies
condition (1), therefore the B-set C is approachable by Player 1. This char-
acterization implies the following properties on convex sets:
Corollary 1.6 (Blackwell [4]) 1. A closed convex set C is either ap-
proachable by Player 1 or excludable by Player 2.
2. A closed convex set C is approachable by Player 1 if and only if every
half-space that contains C is approachable by Player 1.
If condition (3) is not fulfilled for some y0 ∈ ∆(J), then (by the law of large
numbers) Player 2 just has to play accordingly to y0 at each stage to exclude
C. If every half-space that contains C is approachable, then C is a B-set.
Conversely any set that contains an approachable set is approachable.
Blackwell also conjectured the following result on weak-approachability,
proved by Vieille:
Theorem 1.7 (Vieille [12]) A closed set is either weakly-approachable by
Player 1 or weakly-excludable by Player 2.
Vieille [12] constructed a differential game D (in continuous time and with
finite length) such that the finite repetitions of Γ can be seen as a discretiza-
tion of D. The existence of the value for D implies the result.
1.2 Partial monitoring case
The main objective of this section is to provide a simple necessary and
sufficient condition under which a convex set C is approachable in the partial
monitoring case.
Before stating it, we introduce the following notations: the vector of
probabilities over S defined by s(y) = (s(i, y))i∈I ∈ ∆(S)I is called the flag
generated by y ∈ ∆(J). This flag is not observed by Player 1 since if he
plays i ∈ I he only observes a signal s which is the realization of the i-th
component of s(y). However, it is theoretically the maximal information
available to him about y ∈ ∆(J). Indeed, Player 1 will never be able to
distinguish between any two mixed action y and y′ that generate the same
flag, i.e. such that s(y) = s(y′).
Given a flag µ in S, the range of s, s−1(µ) = {y ∈ ∆(J); s(y) = µ} is the
set of mixed actions of Player 2 compatible with µ. P (x, µ) = {ρ(x, y); y ∈
s−1(µ)} is the set of expected payoffs compatible with x ∈ ∆(I) and µ ∈ S.
Our main result is:
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Theorem 1.8 A closed convex set C ⊂ Rd is approachable by Player 1 if
and only if:
∀µ ∈ S,∃x ∈ ∆(I), P (x, µ) ⊂ C. (4)
P (x, ·) can be extended to ∆(S)I (without changing condition (4)) by defin-
ing, for every µ 6∈ S, either P (x, µ) = ∅ or P (x, µ) = P (x,ΠS(µ)), where
ΠS(·) is the projection onto S.
In the full monitoring case, condition (4) is exactly condition (3). In-
deed, if Player 1 observes Player 2’s action then S = J , S = {(y, . . . , y) ∈
∆(J)I ; y ∈ ∆(J)} and given y = (y, . . . , y) ∈ S, P (x,y) = {ρ(x, y)}. Con-
dition (4) implies that for every y ∈ ∆(J) there exists x ∈ ∆(I) such that
ρ(x, y) ∈ C, or equivalently P 2(y) ∩ C 6= ∅.
An other important result is that Corollary 1.6 and Theorem 1.7 do not
extend:
Proposition 1.9 1. There exists a closed convex set that is neither ap-
proachable by Player 1 nor excludable by Player 2
2. An half-space is either approachable by Player 1 or excludable by Player 2
3. There exists a closed convex set that is not approachable by Player 1
while every half-space that contains it is approachable by Player 1
4. There exists a closed convex set that is neither weakly-approachable by
Player 1 nor weakly-excludable by Player 2.
As said in the introduction, the proof of Theorem 1.8 relies on the con-
struction of a strategy that has no internal regret in an auxiliary game with
partial monitoring.
2 Internal regret with partial monitoring
Consider the following two-person repeated game G with partial monitoring.
At stage n ∈ N, we denote by xn ∈ ∆(I) and yn ∈ ∆(J) the mixed actions
chosen by Player 1 and Player 2 (i.e. the laws of in and jn). As before,
we denote by sn the signal observed by Player 1, whose law is the in-th
coordinate of µn = s(jn).
Although payoffs are unobserved, given a flag µ ∈ ∆(S)I and x ∈ ∆(I),
Player 1 evaluates his payoff through G(x, µ) where G is a continuous map
from ∆(I)×∆(S)I to R, not necessarily linear.
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In the full monitoring framework, Foster & Vohra [5] defined internally
consistent strategies (or strategies that have no internal regret) as follows:
Player 1 has asymptotically no internal regret if for every i ∈ I, either the
action i is a best response to his opponent’s empirical distribution of actions
on the set of stages where he actually played i, or the density of this set
(also called the frequency of the action i) converges to zero.
In our framework, G is not linear so every action i ∈ I (or the Dirac mass
on i) might never be a best response; best responses are indeed elements of
∆(I). Thus if we want to define internal regret, we cannot distinguish the
stages as a function of the actions actually played (i.e. in ∈ I) but as a
function of the laws of the actions (i.e. xn ∈ ∆(I)).
We consider strategies described as follows: at stage n Player 1 chooses
(at random) a law x(ln) in a finite set {x(l) ∈ ∆(I); l ∈ L} and given that
choice, in is drawn accordingly to x(ln); ln is called the type of the stage n.
We denote by Nn(l) = {1 ≤ m ≤ n; lm = l} the set of stages (before
the n-th) of type l and for any sequence a = {am ∈ Rd}m∈N, an(l) =∑
m∈Nn(l)
am/|Nn(l)| is the average of a on Nn(l).
Definition 2.1 For every n ∈ N and every l ∈ L, the internal regret of type
l ∈ L at stage n is
Rn(l) = sup
x∈∆(I)
[G(x, µn(l))−G(x(l), µn(l))] ,
where µn(l) is the unobserved average flag on Nn(l).
A strategy σ of Player 1 is (L, ε)-internally consistent if for every strategy
τ of Player 2:
lim sup
n→+∞
|Nn(l)|
n
(
Rn(l)− ε
)
≤ 0, ∀l ∈ L, Pσ,τ−as.
The set L is assumed to be finite, otherwise there would exist trivial strate-
gies such that the frequency of every x(l) converges to zero. In words, if σ is
an (L, ε)-internally consistent strategy then either x(l) is an ε-best response
to µn(l), the unobserved average flag on Nn(l), or this set has a very small
density.
Theorem 2.2 (Lehrer & Solan[8]; Perchet [10]) For every ε > 0, there
exist a finite set L and a (L, ε)-internally consistent strategy σ such that for
every strategy τ of Player 2:
Eσ,τ
[
sup
l∈L
|Nn(l)|
n
(
Rn(l)− ε
)]
= O
(
1√
n
)
and
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∀η > 0,Pσ,τ
(
∃n ≥ N, l ∈ L, |Nn(l)|
n
(
Rn(l)− ε
)
> η
)
≤ O
(
1
η2N
)
.
3 Proofs of the main results
This section is devoted to the proofs of the theorems stated in the previous
section.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 1.8
Let C be a convex set such that for every µ ∈ ∆(S)I there exists xµ ∈
∆(I) such that P (xµ, µ) ⊂ C. Given ε > 0, we are going to construct
an ε-approachability strategy in Γ based on an (L, ǫ)-internally consistent
strategy in some auxiliary game G, where the evaluation functionG is defined
by:
G(x, µ) = − sup
y∈s−1(µ)
dC (ρ(x, y))
if µ ∈ S. If µ /∈ S, then G(x, µ) = G (x,ΠS(µ)) where ΠS is the projection
onto S.
Sufficiency: Any strategy in the auxiliary game G naturally defines a
strategy in the original game Γ. The main idea of the proof is quite simple:
given ε > 0, consider the finite family {x(l); l ∈ L} and the (L, ε)-internally
consistent strategy σ of Player 1 given by Theorem 2.2. Then for every l ∈ L,
either |Nn(l)|/n is very small, or Rn(l) ≤ ε. In that last case, the definition
of G implies that ρn(l) is ε-close to C. Since
ρn =
∑
l∈L
|Nn(l)|
n
ρn(l), (5)
ρn is a convex combination of terms that are ε-close to C. Since C is convex,
ρn is also close to C.
Formally, let σ be a (L, ε)-internally consistent strategy of Player 1 given
by Theorem 2.2. For every θ > 0, there exists N1 ∈ N such that for any
strategy τ of Player 2:
Pσ,τ
(
∀n ≥ N1, sup
l∈L
|Nn(l)|
n
(
Rn(l)− ε
)
≤ θ
)
≥ 1− θ. (6)
Recall that for any µ ∈ ∆(S)I there exists xµ ∈ ∆(I) such that P (xµ, µ) ⊂
C, therefore supz∈∆(I)G(z, µ) = G(xµ, µ) = 0 and
Rn(l) = sup
y∈s−1(µn(l))
dC (ρ(x(l), y)) ≥ dC
(
ρ
(
x(l), n(l)
))
,
8
because s(n(l)) = µn(l) by linearity of s.
The random variables ln and jn are independent (given the finite histo-
ries) and so are in and jn given ln. Thus Hoeffding-Azuma [3, 6]’s inequal-
ity for sums of bounded martingale differences implies that ρ (x(l), n(l)) is
asymptotically close to ρn(l). Explicitly, for every θ > 0, there exists N
2 ∈ N
(independent of σ and τ) such that:
Pσ,τ
(
∀n ≥ N2,∃l ∈ L, |Nn(l)|
n
∣∣ρn(l)− ρ (x(l), n(l)) ∣∣ ≤ θ
)
≥ 1− θ. (7)
Equations (6) and (7) imply that for every n ≥ N = max{N1, N2} and
every l ∈ L, with probability at least 1− 2θ:
|Nn(l)|
n
(
dC (ρn(l)) − ε
) ≤ 2θ.
Since C is a convex set, dC(·) is convex, thus for any strategy τ of
Player 2, with Pσ,τ -probability at least 1− 2θ, for every n ≥ N :
dC(ρn) ≤
∑
l∈L
|Nn(l)|
n
dC(ρn(l)) ≤ 2Lθ + ε,
and C is approachable by Player 1.
Necessity: Conversely, assume that there exists µ0 ∈ ∆(S)I such that
for all x ∈ ∆(I), there is some y(= y(x)) ∈ s−1(µ0) such that dC (ρ(x, y)) >
0. Since ∆(I) is compact, we can assume that there exists δ > 0 such that
dC (ρ(x, y(x))) ≥ δ.
Let T0 be the subset of strategies of Player 2 that generate at any stage
the same flag µ0 (explicitly, a strategy τ belongs to T0 if for every finite
history h2n, τ(h
2
n) ∈ s−1(µ0)). Recall that a strategy σ of Player 1 depends
only on his past actions and on the signals he received. Since at any stage,
two strategies τ and τ ′ in T0 induce the same laws of signals, the couples
(σ, τ) and (σ, τ ′) generate the same probability on the infinite sequences of
moves of Player 1. Therefore Eσ,τ [ın] = Eσ,τ ′ [ın] := xn is independent of τ .
For every n ∈ N, define the strategy τn in T0 by τn(h) = y(xn), for all
finite history h. Since dC(·) is convex, by Jensen’s inequality
Eσ,τn [dC (ρn)] ≥ dC (Eσ,τn [ρn]) .
Since jm is independent of the history hm−1:
Eσ,τn
[
ρ(im, jm)
∣∣hm−1] = Eσ,τn [ρ(im, y(xn))∣∣hm−1]
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hence by linearity of ρ(·, y(xn)),
Eσ,τn
[
ρ(im, jm)
∣∣hm−1] = ρ (Eσ,τn [im∣∣hm−1] , y(xn)) .
Therefore Eσ,τn [ρn] = ρ(xn, y(xn)). Consequently
Eσ,τn [dC (ρn)] ≥ dC (Eσ,τn [ρn]) = dC (ρ(xn, y(xn))) ≥ δ
and for any strategy σ of Player 1 and any stage n ∈ N, Player 2 has a
strategy such that the expected average payoff is at a distance greater than
δ > 0 from C. Thus C is not approachable by Player 1.
Remark 3.1 The fact that C is a convex set is crucial in both parts of the
proof. In the sufficient part, it would otherwise be possible that ρn(l) ∈ C
for every l ∈ L, while ρn /∈ C. In the necessary part, the counterpart could
happen: dC (E [ρn]) ≥ δ while E [dC(ρn)] = 0.
Remark 3.2 The ε-approachability strategy constructed relies on a (L, ε)-
internally consistent strategy, so one can easily show that:
Eσ,τ [dC (ρn)] = ε+O
(
1√
n
)
and
Pσ,τ (∃n ≥ N, dC (ρn)− ε > η) ≤ O
(
1
η2N
)
.
Corollary 3.3 There exists σ a strategy of Player 1 such that for every
η > 0, there exists N ∈ N such that for every strategy τ of Player 2 and
n ≥ N , Eσ,τ [dC (ρn)] ≤ η.
The proof is rather classical and relies on a careful concatenation of εk-
approachability strategies (where the sequence (εk)k∈N decreases towards 0)
called doubling trick (see e.g. Sorin [11], Proposition 3.2). It is therefore
omitted.
3.2 Proof of Proposition 1.9
In the proof of Theorem 1.8, we have shown that if a convex set is not
approachable by Player 1 then for any of his strategy and any n ∈ N, Player 2
has a strategy τn such that ρn is at, at least, δ from C. It does not imply
that C is excludable by Player 2; indeed this would require that τn does not
depend on σ nor n. The proof of Proposition 1.9 relies mainly on the study
of the following example.
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Proof of Proposition 1.9. Consider the following matrix two-person
repeated game where Player 1 (the row player) receives no signal and his
one-dimensional payoffs are defined by :
L R
T 0 1
B -1 0
C := [0;1/2] is neither approachable nor excludable: The closed
convex set C := [0; 1/2] is obviously not approachable by Player 1 (otherwise
Theorem 1.8 implies that there exists x ∈ ∆(I) such that ρ(x, y) ∈ [0, 1/2]
for every y ∈ ∆(J)). More precisely, given a strategy σ of Player 1, we define
τn as follows: if xn (the expected frequency of T up to stage n ∈ N — it
does not depend on Player 2’s strategy) is smaller than 1/4, then τn is the
strategy that always plays L, otherwise that always plays R. Then the law
of large numbers implies that, for n big enough, Eσ,τn [dC (ρn)] is arbitrarily
close to 1/4.
It remains to show that Player 2 cannot exclude C. We prove this by
constructing a strategy σ of Player 1 such that the average payoff is infinitely
often close to 0: σ is played in blocks and the length of the p-th block is
p2p+1. On odd blocks, Player 1 plays T while on even blocks he plays B. At
the end of the block p, the average payoff is at most 1/p if it is an odd block
and at least −1/p otherwise. Hence on two consecutive blocks (the p-th and
the p + 1-th) there is at least one stage such that the average payoff is at
a distance smaller than 1/p to {0}. Therefore {0} and C (since it contains
{0}) is not excludable by Player 2.
An half-space is either approachable by Player 1 or excludable
by Player 2: Let E be an half-space not approachable by Player 1. Then
there exists µ0 ∈ ∆(S)I such that, for every x ∈ ∆(I), P (x, µ0) 6⊂ E. This
implies that there exists δ > 0 such that infx∈∆(I) supy∈s−1(µ0) dE (ρ(x, y)) ≥
δ > 0 and therefore for every x ∈ ∆(I), there exists y ∈ ∆(J) such that
ρ(x, y) is in the complement of Eδ which is convex, since E is an half-
space. Blackwell’s result applies for Player 2 (since we assumed he has full
monitoring), so he can approach the complement of Eδ and exclude E.
C is not approachable by Player 1 while every half-space that
contains it is: An half-space that contains C contains either (−∞, 0] or
[0,+∞) which are approachable by, respectively, always playing T or always
playing B.
C is neither weakly-approachable by Player 1 nor weakly ex-
cludable by Player 2 : we proved that for every strategy σ of Player 1 and
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every n ∈ N big enough, Player 2 has a strategy τn such that Eσ,τn [dC(ρn)] =
1/2. Hence C is not weakly approachable.
Conversely, let τ be a strategy of Player 2 in the game repeated 2n times
(where n is large enough) and M ∈ N be any integer. Consider the strategy
σ of Player 1 that consists in playing T during the first n stages. Since ρn, the
average payoff after those n stages, belongs to [0; 1], there exists an integer
k1 ∈ {1, . . . ,M} such that ρn belongs to [k1−1M ; k1M ] with Pσ,τ -probability at
least 1M . Note that, given τ , Player 1 can compute this k.
Assume that, from stage n + 1 on, the strategy σ dictates to play i.i.d
action B with probability k1M and action T with probability 1 − k1M . If n is
large enough, the probability that the average payoff between stages n + 1
and 2n belongs to [− k1M − 1M ; 1− k1M + 1M ] is close to one (say bigger than 1/2,
this is again a direct consequence of the law of large number). Therefore,
this strategy σ ensures that with Pσ,τ -probability at least
1
2M the average
payoff over the 2n stages belongs to [− 1M ; 12 + 12M ].
Denote by
(
C2/M
)c
the complement of the 2M -neighborhood of C. Given
a strategy τ of Player 2 and an integer n big enough, the strategy σ we
described ensures that Eσ,τ
[
d(C2/M)
c (ρ2n)
]
≥ 1
2M2
. Therefore, for every
M ∈ N, (C2/M)c is not weakly-approachable by Player 2 hence C is not
weakly-excludable.
The strategy σ we described can be easily made independent of τ by,
for example, choosing k1 ∈ {1, . . . ,M} at random; indeed, this would imply
that Eσ,τ
[
d(C2/M)
c (ρ2n)
]
≥ 1
2M3
. 
These results hold if one chooses C3 := [0; 1/3] instead of [0; 1/2]. In
fact, it only remains to prove that C3 is not weakly-excludable by Player 2.
Consider the game repeated 3n times and the strategy σ, defined by block
of size n, that plays on the first block always T , on the second block i.i.d.
action B with probability k1M . The average payoff on those two block belongs
to a small neighborhood of [0; 1/2], hence to some [k2−1M ,
k2
M ] (where k2 ≤ M2 )
with probability at least 1M . Assume that on the third block Player 1 plays
i.i.d action B with probability 2k2M then the average payoff over the three
blocks belongs to a small neighborhood of [0; 1/3] with probability at least
1
(2M)2 . Therefore C3 is not weakly excludable.
Since this proof can be generalized to any set Ck = [0;
1
k ], even the sin-
gleton {0} is neither weakly-approachable nor weakly-excludable; we recall
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that in the full monitoring framework all those convex sets are approachable
by Player 1.
3.3 Remarks on the counterexample
Following Mertens, Sorin & Zamir’s notations [9] (see Definition 1.2 p. 149),
Player 1 can guarantee v in a zero-sum repeated game Γ∞ if
∀ε > 0,∃σε,∃N ∈ N,Eσε,τ [ρn] ≥ v − ε,∀τ,∀n ≥ N,
where σε is a strategy of Player 1, and τ any strategy of Player 2. Player 2
can defend v if:
∀ε > 0,∀σε,∃τ,∃N ∈ N,Eσε,τ [ρn] ≤ v + ε,∀n ≥ N.
If Player 1 can guarantee v and Player 2 defend v, then v is the maxmin of
Γ∞. The minmax v is defined in a dual way and Γ∞ has a value if v = v.
These definitions can be extended to the vector payoff framework: we
say that Player 1 can guarantee a set E if he can approach E:
∀ε > 0,∃σε,∃N ∈ N,Eσε,τ [dE (ρn)] ≤ ε,∀τ,∀n ≥ N.
In the counterexample of the proof of Proposition 1.9, Player 1 cannot
guarantee the convex set C = {0} and Player 2 cannot defend it since:
∃σ,∀ε > 0,∀τ,∀N ∈ N,∃n ≥ N,Eσ,τ [dC (ρn)] ≤ ε.
To keep the notations of zero-sum repeated game, one could say that the
game we constructed has no maxmin.
Blackwell [4] also gave an example of a game (with vector payoff) without
maxmin in the full monitoring case. The main differences between the two
examples are:
i) in the partial monitoring case this set can be convex (which cannot
occur in the full monitoring framework);
ii) the strategy of Player 1 is such that the average payoff is infinitely
often close to C. However, unlike Blackwell’s example, he does not
know at which stages.
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4 Repeated game with incomplete information on
one side, with partial monitoring
Aumann & Maschler [2] introduced the class of two-person zero-sum games
with incomplete information on one side. Those games are described as
follows: Nature chooses k0 from a finite set of states K according to some
known probability p ∈ ∆(K). Player 1 (the maximizer) is informed about k0
but not Player 2. At stage m ∈ N, Player 1 (resp. Player 2) chooses im ∈ I
(resp. jm ∈ J) and the payoff is ρk0m = ρk0(im, jm). Player 1 observes jm
and Player 2 does not observe im nor ρm but receives a signal sm whose
law is sk0(im, jm) ∈ ∆(S). As in the previous sections, we define sk(x) =(
sk(x, j)
)
j∈K
, for every x ∈ ∆(I).
A strategy σ (resp. τ) of Player 1 (resp. Player 2) is a mapping from
K × ⋃∈N (I × J × S)m to ∆(I) (resp. from ⋃m∈N (J × S)m to ∆(J)). At
stage m+ 1, σ(k, h1m) is the law of im+1 after the history h
1
m if the chosen
state is k.
We define Γ1 the one-shot game with expected payoff
∑
k∈K p
kρk(xk, y)
and Γ∞(p) the infinitely repeated game. We denote by v∞(p) its value, if
it exists (i.e. if both Player 1 and Player 2 can guarantee it). Aumann
& Maschler [2] (Theorem C, p. 191) proved that Γ∞(p) has a value and
characterized it.
Let us first introduce the operator Cav and the non-revealing game
D(p): for any function f from ∆(I)×∆(J) to R, Cav(f)(·) is the smallest
(pointwise) concave function greater than f .
A profile of mixed actions x = (xk)k∈K ∈ ∆(I)K is non-revealing at
p ∈ ∆(K) (and induces the flag µ ∈ ∆(S)J) if the flag induced by x is
independent of the state:
NR(p, µ) =
{
x = (x1, . . . , xK) ∈ ∆(I)K∣∣ sk(xk) = µ,∀k st pk > 0} .
We denote by NR(p) =
⋃
µ∈∆(S)J NR(p, µ) the set of non-revealing strate-
gies. For every µ ∈ ∆(S)J , D(p, µ) (resp. D(p)) is the one-stage game Γ1
where Player 1 is restricted to NR(p, µ) (resp. NR(p)) and its value is de-
noted by u(p, µ) (resp. u(p)), with u(p, µ) = −∞ if NR(p, µ) = ∅ (resp.
u(p) = −∞ if NR(p) = ∅).
Theorem 4.1 (Aumann & Maschler [2]) The game Γ∞ has a value de-
fined by v∞(p) = Cav(u)(p).
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Proof. Player 1 can guarantee u(p): indeed ifNR(p) 6= ∅, he just has to play
i.i.d. an optimal strategy in NR(p) and otherwise u(p) = −∞. Therefore,
using the splitting procedure (see Lemma 5.2 p. 25 in [2]), Player 1 can
guarantee Cav(u)(p).
It remains to show that Player 2 can also guarantee Cav(u)(p). The
function Cav(u)(·) is concave and continuous, therefore there exists m =
(m1, . . . ,mk) ∈ RK such that Cav(u)(p) = 〈m, p〉 and u(q) ≤ Cav(u)(q) ≤
〈m, q〉. Instead of constructing a strategy of Player 2 that minimizes the
expected payoff
∑
k∈K p
kρkn, it is enough to construct a strategy such that
each ρkn is smaller than m
k, for every state k that has a positive probability
accordingly to Player 2’s posterior.
Therefore, we consider an auxiliary two-person repeated game with vec-
tor payoff where at stage n ∈ N, Player 2 (resp. Player 1) chooses jn accord-
ingly to yn ∈ ∆(J) (resp. (i1n, . . . , iKn ) accordingly to (x1n, . . . , xKn ) ∈ ∆(I)K).
Player 2 receives a signal sn whose law is s
k0(ik0n , jn) where k0 is the true
state. We denote by µn = s
k0(xk0n ) the expected flag of stage n. The k-th
component of the vector payoff ρn is defined by ρ
k(ikn, jn) if µn belongs to
Sk, the range of sk and −A := −maxk∈K ‖ρk‖∞ otherwise1. Conversely,
the set of compatible payoffs given a flag µ ∈ ∆(S)J , y ∈ ∆(J) and a state
k, is defined by:
P k(µ, y) =
{
ρk(xk, y)
∣∣∣sk(xk) = µ} if µ ∈ Sk, otherwise P k(µ, y) = {−A},
and the set of compatible vector payoffs is P (µ, y) = Πk∈KP
k(µ, y) ⊂ RK .
If Player 2 can approach M = {m ∈ RK ;mk ≤mk,∀k ∈ K} =m+RK− ,
then he can guarantee Cav(u)(p). Theorem 1.8 implies that the convex set
M is approachable if and only if, for every µ ∈ ∆(S)I there exists y ∈ ∆(J)
such that P (µ, y) ⊂M .
Hence it is enough to prove that this property holds. Assume the con-
verse: there exists µ0 ∈ ∆(S)I such that for every y ∈ ∆(J), P (µ0, y) is not
included in M .
We denote by K(µ0) =
{
k ∈ K;µ0 ∈ Sk
}
the set of states that are com-
patible with µ0: if Player 2 observes µ0, then he knows that the true state is
inK(µ0). For every y ∈ ∆(J) and k ∈ K(µ0), ωk0(y) = supsk(xk)=µ0 ρk(xk, y)
is the worst payoff for Player 2 in state k. The fact that P (µ0, y) is not
included in M implies that ω0(y) = (ω
k
0 (y))k∈K(µ0) does not belong to
1We use this notation, because if µn is not in the range of s
k, then Player 2 knows that
the true state is not k, and therefore does not need to minimize the k-th component of
the payoff vector
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M0 = {m ∈ RK(µ0);mk ≤mk,∀k ∈ K(µ0)}. Define the convex set:
W0 = {ω0(y); y ∈ ∆(J)}+ RK(µ0)+
⋂
B(0, A),
with B(0, A) the closed ball of radius A. Obviously W0 ∩ M0 = ∅ and,
by linearity of each ρk, W0 is a compact convex set. So there exists a
strongly separating hyperplane H0 = {ω ∈ RK(µ0); 〈ω, q0〉 = b} such that
supm∈M0〈m, q0〉 < infω∈W0〈ω, q0〉. Every component of q0 must be non-
negative (since M0 is negatively comprehensive), therefore up to a normal-
ization, we can assume that q0 belongs to ∆(K(µ0)).
Define W =W0 ×RK\K(µ0) and q ∈ ∆(K) by q(k) = q0(k) if k ∈ K(µ0)
and 0 otherwise. Then, H = {ω ∈ RK ; 〈ω, q〉 = b} strongly separates M and
W , therefore:
〈m, q〉 < min
ω∈W0
〈ω, q〉 = min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈NR(q,µ0)
∑
k∈K
qkρk(xk, y) = u(q, µ0) ≤ u(q)
and by definition of m, u(q) ≤ 〈m, q〉 which is impossible.
SoM is approachable by Player 2, he can guarantee Cav(u)(p) in Γ∞(p)
and v∞(p) = Cav(u)(p). 
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